




Safe Return and Reintegration of the Iraqi IDPs in the Governorates of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin: An Analytical Study



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AoO	Area of Origin
CSO	Central Statistics Organization
DK	Do Not Know
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GC	Geneva Call
GoI	Government of Iraq
HH, HHs	Household, Households
IDI	In-Depth Interview
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IQD	Iraqi Dinar
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISg	Islamic State group (or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - ISIS, or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant - ISIL)
JCC	Joint Crisis Coordination Center
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
MDC	Mobile Data Collection
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOC	National Operation Center
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces
SD	Sub-District
SOSS	Statistics Organization for Society Support
UN	United Nations
WFP	World Food Programme
YBS	Sinjar Resistance Units

GLOSSARY

Community

A Community is defined as a group (of any size) of people living in the same place, sharing common government and other services, as well as associated interactional social, religious, economic, political, cultural, and historical backgrounds, interests, rules, regulations, and laws. In this report, the sample of community members includes people who have returned to their location of origin in Iraq, as well as people who have never left the location.

Displacement

Displacement is the movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. It covers both internal and cross-border displacement.¹

Freedom of Movement (right to)

In human rights law, freedom of movement is a human right comprising three basic elements: freedom of movement within the territory of a country and to choose one's residence, the right to leave any country and the right to return to one's own country. Under human rights law, the right to freedom of movement does not entail a right to enter and to remain in a State which is not the individual's own country, except when the State has an obligation to admit the person under international law.²

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Internally Displaced Persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or (IDPs) obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.³

Migration

Migration is defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as 'a process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. It encompasses any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition, or causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people and economic migration' (IOM, 2004).⁴

Post-Crisis Return

In the context of this report, 'post-crisis return' means all the people who returned to their location of origin in Iraq after the official government announcement of the territorial defeat of ISg in December 2017.

Reintegration

Reintegration involves reconnecting and re-establishing oneself in society; it is 'a process of recovery,

¹ Adapted from Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, annexed to United Nations Commission on Human Rights Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39, Addendum (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 5, para. 2 of the introduction.

² Adapted from Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217(A), Art. 13.

³ Adapted from Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, annexed to United Nations Commission on Human Rights Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39, Addendum (11 February 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 6.

⁴ <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>

and economic and social inclusion' following a return, usually to the Area of Origin (AoO). The process involves a consideration of factors, usually with a reference to the provision of, and access to, government and non-government services. IOM defines the components of reintegration as: Social reintegration implies the access by a returnee to public services and infrastructures in his or her country of origin, including access to health, education, housing, justice and social protection schemes. Psychosocial reintegration is the reinsertion of a returnee into personal support networks (friends, relatives, neighbors) and civil society structures (associations, self-help groups and other organizations), including re-engagement with the values, mores, way of living, language, moral principles, ideology, and traditions of the country of origin's society. Economic reintegration is the process by which a returnee re-enters the economic life of his or her country of origin and is able to sustain a livelihood.

Safe Return

Safe return is the movement of persons which is secure and which limits all forms of armed and un-armed conflict (military, armed actors, tribal, etc.), war-related crimes, violence, threats, natural disasters, exploitation, and any unscrupulous behavior of border officials, traffickers, agents, and others, and which provides information to returnees so that they can make choices and assess risks. This is the case for both documented and undocumented returnees. Documented (regular) returnees are people with correct documents, visas and/or permits to enter area of origin. Undocumented (irregular) returnees are people without administrative documents required to enter area of origin.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June 2014, Iraq witnessed the largest displacement of its people in history due to the Islamic State Group (ISg), otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), taking control of vast areas of land in the north and west regions of the country. From 2014 to 2021, about 6.12 million Iraqis were displaced. About 4.9 million Iraqis returned to their areas of origin (AoO), representing 12% of the population, but about 1.2 million did not return to their AoO (3% of the population). This 3% represents Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Iraq, living primarily in camps and host communities. About 944,000 IDPs of them are from three governorates: 669,000 (70.9%) in Nineveh; 140,000 (14.8%) in Salahaddin; and 135,000 (14.3%) in Anbar.

Geneva Call (GC) requested an analytical study of the safe return and reintegration of IDPs in the Iraqi governorates of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin to gain quantitative and qualitative data to better understand the challenges and barriers that IDPs face when returning into their AoO. Four experts and their team from the Erbil NGO, Statistics Organization for Society Support (SOSS), in cooperation with GC, conducted the study from October to December 2021. Primarily, the team worked in: Anbar (Jazira Al-Khalidiya), Nineveh (Khana Sor), and Salahaddin (Balad) to collect data from 1) IDPs, and 2) Community members (people already in the location and people who never left the location).

Findings

From 2014 to 2021, there were two significant displacement waves coinciding with ISg's movement and control. The first wave occurred in 2014. The second wave occurred in Anbar and Salahaddin governorates in 2015, earlier than Nineveh, which occurred in 2016 after the spread of violence onto the Nineveh plains. The Iraqi authorities closed many displacement camps between 2017 and 2019, but the current number of IDPs still remains high at 349,924 inside the three governorates: 35,312 in Anbar (about 6,000 families), 256,034 in Nineveh (44,000 families), and 58,578 in Salahaddin (10,000 families).

Safety has generally improved in Anbar, but ISg is present in the neighboring desert, tribal conflicts and revenge, and the non-local security forces are also present. In Nineveh, there are different security actors present, especially in Sinjar, where Turkish warplanes irregularly conduct airstrikes. In Salahuddin, the security situation remains critical because ISg is still present in some locations, in addition to the political conflicts and distrust between people and security forces are two challenges. Tribal leaders prevent Anbar IDPs from returning. Salahuddin IDPs say that they cannot return due to the presence of ISF, armed actors, and land occupiers.

IDPs in Camps

To January 2021, the Government of Iraq (GoI) dismantled 14 formal IDP camps or classified them as informal sites: one camp in Anbar, three in Baghdad, three in Diyala, one in Kerbala, two in Kirkuk, three in Nineveh, and one in Salahaddin. The GoI will soon close the remaining camps. KRG-controlled camps, with about 180,000 IDPs, are not anticipated to close anytime soon. The situation in the camps inside the three governorates is severe, especially in Amiriyat Alsmud (Amiriyat Al-Falluja) in Anbar; Jad'ah 1, Jad'ah 5, Khazir, Hasan Sham in Nineveh; and Mihatat Balad (informal camp) in Salahaddin.

Opportunities for Safe Return

Generally, people residing in the community have no issues with returnees, except if the families have engaged with ISg. Regardless of the location, interviewed IDPs stated that the relationship between the community and returnees is either good or very good. More than 70% of participants in Anbar, and 65% in both Nineveh and Salahaddin, stated that the relationship is good or very good. The remaining stated that the relationship was poor due to political and security tensions, and revenge attacks.

Interviewed respondents stated that the prime decision to return is the safety of their AoO. The second reason is the availability of housing, and the third reason is their emotional desire to return. Having job

opportunities is also a key reason for returning. However, 75% of IDPs say that their ability to return home is hindered by their extended absence from their AoO. About 64% said they have not received compensation for damaged housing, with the rest saying that the area has not been sufficiently rehabilitated, and there is a lack of livelihood opportunities and basic services, such as water and electricity. Over 37% of participants in Anbar, 34% in Nineveh, and 66% in Salahaddin stated that they need support from the government and INGOs for agriculture and livestock.

In Anbar, over 82% of community members and over 27% of IDPs stated that employment and livelihood remained an issue to enable returnees to reintegrate into their AoO. More than 56% of community members and over 44% of IDPs in Nineveh also stated that returnees needed employment and livelihood opportunities to return. In Salahaddin, 76% of the community and 71% of IDPs agreed.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Two types of IDPs must be differentiated for safe return and reintegration: 1) IDPs who do not have the means to return, because their farms and homes have been occupied, and due to the lack of housing, livelihoods, and/or lost official documents, and 2) IDP households (HHs) where members had engaged with ISg, because AoO communities remain suspicious and unsupportive of these families.

Safety and Security: The security sector should be reformed and improved. For example, the security pursuit should be stopped, military checkpoints should be reduced, security leaders should be unified, and people from the same area should be chosen to help authorities avoid local tensions and conflicts.

Housing and Infrastructure: Access to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and shelter at the AoO, should be provided to support the IDP's decision to return. Their main issues are housing and infrastructure, because armed actors do not let them rebuild their houses due to political or security issues in some locations. Hence, there should be an appropriate law related to the compensation of HHs whose properties were destroyed or stolen due to conflicts and violations. The 2009 law 20 needs to be revised.

Al-Hol Camp in Syria: The refugees of Iraqi families that are located in Al-Hol camp are mostly women and children under 12 years old, whose family members engaged with ISg. Some from the Al-Hol camp returned to Iraq and settled in the Jad'ah 1 camp under strict GoI security restrictions. National and international NGOs should make efforts to support Iraqis in the Al-Hol camp to reintegrate them into the community again.

Livelihood and Community Resilience: Financial support is needed until IDPs gain employment or livelihoods in their AoO. This includes on-the-job training, vocational training, and in-kind grants. Cash for work can be useful to support IDPs to work in the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic services. Agriculture, animal husbandry, and livestock support are also needed, such as access to high-yield seed varieties, fertilizers, training courses, and investment projects to boosting productivity (e.g. irrigation systems, greenhouses, and clean water channels). Vulnerable IDP groups (widows, divorced women, minors, and people with special needs) should receive consideration for support.

Education and its Instruments: Education services should be provided to all returnees equally, regardless of ethnicity and marginalization. Support education services in Khana Sor and Balad specifically to improve deficiencies, such as the shortage of schools and teaching staff, which deters IDPs from returning.

Social Interaction and Reintegration: There should be a reintegration program to ensure that IDPs have no fear of discrimination and social isolation. Tribal leaders can provide support to reintegrate IDPs and ensure that community members treat returnees in a normal manner with mutual respect.

Health Support: Expand the offer of critical public health services in the AoO, with a focus on health centres through the provision of medical supplies and health facilities. Also, consider providing an easily accessible mobile medical health service team in these areas (if applicable).

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context

Geneva Call (GC) requested an analytical study of the safe return and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Iraqi governorates of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin under the auspices of the Statistics Organization for Society Support (SOSS). SOSS is an organization that conducts research, studies, assessments, evaluations, feasibility studies, market research, data collection, analyses, and trainings to support society on civilian issues in Iraq.

From 2014 to 2021, about 6.12 million Iraqis were displaced. About 4.9 million returned to their areas of origin (AoO), representing 12% of the Iraqi population. About 1.2 million of them represent IDPs that did not return to their AoO (3% of the Iraqi population). The majority of the 15% are from three governorates: Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin. These three governorates share geographical and international borders with Syria (except Salahaddin). Even governorates near to and bordering these three provinces, such as Kirkuk, Diyala, and Baghdad, have been impacted by the displacement of their residents and the activities of the Islamic State Group (ISg) in their areas (Figure 1).⁵




Figure 1: No. of IDPs in Iraqi Governorates in Sept. 2021

More than 104,000 IDPs are living in critical shelters (such as tents, uninhabitable houses, unfinished buildings, and religious buildings), 182,000 are living in IDP camps, 844,000 are living in inhabitable houses/apartments, and 59,000 are living in other types of shelters (host communities, hotels, and owned properties). The status of IDPs in the camps and critical shelters is poor in terms of health, psychological wellbeing, economics, and administration. The Government of Iraq (GoI) closed 16 camps by January 2021, leaving IDPs without assurances that they would be able to return home securely, find alternative safe shelter, or get affordable services. International and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have limited their support to IDPs, except the World Food Programme (WFP) which provides monthly financial aid of 12,000 IQD per family member (about USD\$8.1).^{6,7}

A woman who lives in a camp says: "Tell me, please, which family in Iraq can afford to live on twelve thousand [IQD] a month? In the past, several NGOs were assisting us in various ways; however, they are no longer assisting us. And our daily electrical supply is less than five hours."

A man who lives in a camp says: "Please, help us, or ask NGOs to help us. Camp management has cut off our health services."

Another woman says: "Is it possible to live in a camp in my own country? Should my children be born and raised in the camp? Do I have to bear the consequences of other family members who have been involved with ISg?"

⁵ DTM – IOM Dataset Round 123, Number of IDPs and returnees (Master list datasets, Sep. 2021, (2/10/2021), <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList#Datasets>.

⁶ According to the site visit of the camps and conversation with IDPs during the field survey of this study.

⁷ Human Rights Watch (HRW), Iraq: Inadequate plans for camp closures, Aug. 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-inadequate-plans-camp-closures>.



Children of Khazir camp in Nineveh governorate with the hope of returning, and an interview with the head of household

There is a national perception that a large number of IDPs have returned and that everything is fine with them. However, there are many locations that continue to have sporadic ISg operations, armed actors, security and political tensions, village and sub-district curfews, private property seizures, tribal reprisals, and a lack of basic services.

A returnee of one of the three targeted areas says: "In addition to the failure of some IDPs to secure security approvals, there are tribes fighting for property, so many households aren't returning. There are eight to ten tribes in this area, including one that has considerable influence but has yet to return due to tribe disagreements."

When considering an analytical study of IDPs and returnees, the study team faced several questions: How to ensure the safe return of IDPs? How to reintegrate IDPs with communities? What are the options for providing basic services to returnees? How to enhance the social cohesion between communities and returnees? How to create trust between security/political

Another returnee says: "Despite the fact that PMF [Popular Mobilization Forces] was in control of the area, a murder occurred two years ago, and twenty-nine people were killed. As a result, families are apprehensive about returning to their homes. Strong government assistance, as well as safety and livelihoods, will help IDPs to return. IDPs' homes were destroyed, they were not compensated by the government or any NGO, and their agricultural resources were burned and destroyed as a result of the liberation operations."

actors and IDPs? Are IDPs allowed freedom of movement within the governorate for day-to-day activities? What is the situation of ISg families who live outside or inside Iraq?

This study employs quantitative and qualitative data collection methodologies to address these concerns. The team focused the discussion on the measure of 'successful' or 'effective' safe return and reintegration around the perceptions, knowledge, and aspirations of the IDPs. At the same time, the complexities are placed within systemic factors within the control of the government, and factors beyond the control of any individual or set of stakeholders. This study has been designed to provide insight into systemic structures and dynamics in relation to the safe return of IDPs.

In this study, three areas were selected from the three Iraqi governorates:

1. Anbar: Jazira Al-Khalidiya;

2. Nineveh: Khana Sor; and
3. Salahaddin: Balad.

These three locations were chosen due to the following reasons:

- The large number of IDPs that did not return to their area of origin due to their reluctance to return or because they were not allowed to return;⁸
- The security/political situation in the targeted areas;
- The willingness at the sub-district and district levels of the designated governorates to attempt to resolve the issue of the safe return of IDPs;
- The decision of the GoI to close all of the IDP camps in the areas.⁹

1.2 Overview of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin Governorates

In June 2014, Iraq witnessed its largest process of internal migration and displacement in history. This was due to ISg's invasion and control over vast areas in the northern and western regions of Iraq, and the subsequent military outbreak. As a result, large numbers of citizens, mostly from Nineveh, Anbar, and Salahaddin (predominantly Sunni Muslims), moved towards Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and other Iraqi provinces.

1.2.1 Anbar Governorate

Anbar is Iraq's largest governorate. It is located in central Iraq and is bordered on the east by the governorates of Baghdad, Babil, and Karbala; on the north by Salahaddin and Nineveh; on the west by the international borders of Jordan and Syria; and on the south by Najaf governorate and the international border of Saudi Arabia. The total estimated population of Anbar in 2021 was 1,914,165 individuals with a growth rate of 2%.¹⁰ The total area of Anbar is 136,265 km² representing 31.7% of the total area of Iraq. It includes 11 districts (20 sub-districts): Al-Amiriy, Al-Ka'im, Al-Falluja, Al-Habbaniya, Al-Karma, Al-Ramadi



Overall Objective of the Study

This study will serve two main purposes. The first purpose is to provide GC in Iraq with quantitative and qualitative data to gain a better understanding of the overall challenges and barriers that IDPs face when returning and reintegrating into their areas of origin. The second purpose is to diagnose the main barriers of returning and of effective integration through deeper data analyses of the collected qualitative and quantitative data. As a result, the study's key goals are as follows:

1. *Provide a clear overview of the context and define the challenges and barriers of returning IDPs;*
2. *Conduct deeper analyses in the targeted locations to diagnose the main barriers of returning;*
3. *Analyze and identify, through feedback from stakeholders, proposed ways to address the challenges of returning, and how effective integration can be established;*
4. *Focus on return issues of Iraqi families associated with the Islamic State Group from Al-Hol camp to the camps inside Iraq and further to their areas of origin.*

⁸ According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data, September 2021; IOM Dataset Round 123, Number of IDPs and returnees (Master list datasets, Sep. 2021, (2/10/2021), <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList#Datasets>.

⁹ GoI, Iraqi government continues to support voluntary return of IDPs as it oversees closure of remaining displacement camps, April 2021, (2/11/2021), <https://gds.gov.iq/iraqi-government-continues-to-support-voluntary-return-of-idps-as-it-oversees-closure-of-remaining-displacement-camps/>.

¹⁰ Central Statistics Organization (CSO), Iraq's estimated population 2015 - 2030, (10/11/2021), http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=174&jsn_setmobile=no.


(Center of Anbar), Al-Rutba, Ana, Haditha, Heet, and Rawa.¹¹ Jazira Al-khalidiya belongs to Al-Habbaniya district, which consists of five villages: Alubai, Albushahab, Albusoda, Albuhuzem, Albuthiab, Albujuhsh, Alkarabla, Algartan, and Almalahma.

ISg held a critical role in Anbar, as it was considered their last stronghold. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) recontrolled this area in August 2016. The people of this area faced many security, political, and economic issues and violations due to the presence of ISg, which resulted in their displacement several times. Currently, some households (HHs) are living within Iraqi camps, such as 7 Kilo camps, Amiriyat Alsmud (Amiriyat Al-Falluja), and maybe KRG's camps.

Because the governorate of Anbar shares a border with the Syrian Republic, many ISgs and their families fled to Syria and settled there. Due to tribal retaliation and security concerns, a large number of Iraqi ISg families continue to reside there and are unable to return. With the assistance of international NGOs, the Gol strives to return these families to Iraq. The Gol began implementing the process of returning families, mainly from Al-Hol camp in Hasaka governorate, into Iraq's Jad'ah camp in Qayyarah district in Nineveh governorate.¹²

1.2.2 Nineveh Governorate

Nineveh (also called Ninewa or Mosul) is the second largest governorate in Iraq after Baghdad, with an estimated population of 4,030,006 individuals in 2021 and a growth rate of 2%.¹³ It is located in the northern part of Iraq and is bordered by Erbil to the east, Salahaddin and Anbar to the south, Duhok to the north, and the international border with Syria to the west. The total area of Nineveh is 33,313 km² representing 8.6% of the total area of Iraq. It includes 9 districts (31 SDs): Al-Ba'aj, Al-Hadhar (Hatra), Al-Hamdaniya, Al-Shekhan, Makhmur, Mosul (Center of Nineveh), Sinjar, Telafar, and Telkef.¹⁴ According to Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, many areas of Nineveh governorates are disputed territories between KRG and Gol, such as areas in Al-Hamdaniya, Al-Shekhan, Makhmur, Sinjar, Telafar, and Telkef districts. These regions were demographically changed in favor of Arab habitants during the Baath Party's authority prior to 2003, and the majority of residents are non-Arab.¹⁵ In August 2014, ISg invaded Sinjar. Thousands of Yazidi women and children were kidnapped and enslaved, and over 5,000 Yazidis were massacred as a result of the invasion. Nearly 3,000 kidnapped women and girls are still missing, according to the United Nations (UN), after being trafficked and enslaved in other ISg controlled areas. The



¹¹ CSO, Anbar's Statistical Brief 2018, (11/11/2021),

http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=1203.

¹² The new humanitarian, Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria's Al-Hol camp, June, 2021, (11/11/2021),

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/6/7/Iraqi-repatriations-Syria-al-Hol-camp-fear>.

¹³ Central Statistics Organization (CSO), Iraq's estimated population 2015 - 2030, (10/11/2021),

http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=174&jsn_setmobile=no.

¹⁴ CSO, Nineveh's Statistical Brief 2018, (11/11/2021),

http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=1218.


¹⁵ Iraqi Parliament Counsel, "دستور جمهورية العراق" ("Constitution of Republic of Iraq"), Parliament's official website, (12/11/2021), <https://ar.parliament.iq/الدستور-العراقي>.

population of Sinjar district is estimated at 500,000 individuals; a significant portion of them fled into KRI's camps.^{16,17} According to the office of the rescued Yazidi abductees, there were 6,417 Yazidis who were kidnapped and enslaved (3,548 females, 2,869 males). The number of survivors from them was about 3,550 (1,206 females, 339 males, 1,049 female children, 956 male children). The number of mass graves discovered in Sinjar so far is 82, in addition to dozens of individual cemetery sites. It is still unknown what happened to 2,753 Yazidis (1,293 females, 1,470 males).¹⁸

The political and security actors in the region are ISF, PMF, Ezidkhan Protection Units (HPE or HPS), Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Shingal, People's Protection Units (YPG), and Sinjar Alliance (Ezidkhan Command for Liberating Sinjar). Sinjar Alliance consists of Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) and Yazidkhan Women's Units (YPJ-Sinjar). Both of them are political Yazidi armed actors affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and for that reason Turkish warplanes irregularly carried out airstrikes on Sinjar.¹⁹ One of the tensest areas in Sinjar district is Khana Sor town, which belongs to Sinuni sub-district (Al-Shamal SD) – Sinjar district, which consists of old and new Khana Sor. All residents in Khana Sor profess the Yazidi religion. Many IDPs from new Khana Sor returned to their houses, but for IDPs previously in old Khana Sor did not return due to insecurity, tensions, and destroyed houses. Most IDPs from Khana Sor are living in the camps of Duhok governorate, especially in Chamishko camp. More than 350,000 Yazidis have not been able to return to their AoO due to tensions, insecurity, and infrastructure concerns.²⁰

1.2.3 Salahaddin Governorate

Salahaddin (written also as Salah Al-Deen or Salaha Al-Din) is former President Saddam Hussein's birthplace and the source of Baath Party supporters. The estimated population is about 1,723,546 individuals with a growth rate equal of 2.6%.²¹ It is located in the central part of Iraq and is bordered by the Nineveh governorate to the north; Erbil to the east; Baghdad to the south; and Anbar to the west. The total area of Salahaddin is 23,398 km² representing 5.6% of Iraq's total area. It includes 10 districts (17 SDs): Al-Alam, Al-Dur, Al-Sharqat, Balad, Baiji, Dujail, Samarra, Tikrit (Center of Nineveh), and Tuz Khurmatu.²²



After the 2014 events of Nineveh, the rapid collapse of the Iraqi army, the Iraqi army retreated, and the ISg seized Salahaddin. At that time, many people fled into KRI and continue to be displaced there. In 2016, the ISF, PMF, and Sunni tribes recontrolled the governorate from ISg's control, but additional civilians have been displaced, their homes were destroyed,

¹⁶ Mehmet Alaca, Iraqi Yazidis: Trapped Between the KDP and the PKK, Fikra Forum, Washington Institute, 2020, (12/11/2021), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-yazidis-trapped-between-kdp-and-pkk>.

¹⁷ European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), WHEN THE WEAPONS FALL SILENT: RECONCILIATION IN SINJAR AFTER ISIS, Oct. 2018, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/when_the_weapons_fall_silent_reconciliation_in_sinjar_after_isisFINAL.pdf.

¹⁸ office of the rescued Yazidi abductees, IDI interview with the head of the office, 13, 1, 2022.

¹⁹ Suspected Turkish warplanes target Shingal (Sinjar) twice in five days, Rudaw.net, (12/11/2021), <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/11122021>.

²⁰ Mehmet Alaca, Iraqi Yazidis: Trapped Between the KDP and the PKK, Fikra Forum, Washington Institute, 2020, (12/11/2021), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-yazidis-trapped-between-kdp-and-pkk>.

²¹ Central Statistics Organization (CSO), Iraq's estimated population 2015 - 2030, (10/11/2021), http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=174&jsn_setmobile=no.

²² CSO, Salahaddin's Statistical Brief 2018, (12/11/2021), http://cosit.gov.iq/ar/?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=1201.

and their families were subjected to numerous security, political, and economic challenges and violations. The governorate's infrastructure has been totally devastated. In spite of Gol's efforts to return the IDPs to their AoO, there are some significant IDP camps inside Salahaddin governorate, such as Jad'ah camps, Mihatat balad camp; and some other camps outside the governorate, such as Erbil's camps (Bahirka camp and Dibaga camp) and Suleimaniya's Ashti camp.

Balad is one of the Salahuddin's districts that has undergone many political and security problems and tensions. Citizens of Balad are living in Mihatat Balah camp which is 2-3 kilometres from their homes, but they are unable to return due to insecurity. Most of the IDP's are from the outskirts of Balad, such as Tal Al-Dhahab village, Said Gharib village, Mihatat Balad village, Al-Farhatiya SD, and Aziz Balad SD. The ISF, PMF, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), and tribes are in charge of this district in terms of security and politics.

1.3 Methodology

To set the objectives of the analytical study, and to clarify the key issues to gain a common understanding of the assignment, the study team communicated with GC through emails, telephone calls, and meetings. The GC and SOSS met in Erbil city to discuss the implementation of the study, develop the research methodology, and device the data collection materials.



Quantitative and qualitative data were collected using mobile data collection (MDC) through in-depth interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The data collection materials included IDI and FGD guides, and a survey questionnaire.

Four experts conducted the study from mid-October to the end of December 2021, assisted by five supervisors from each governorate, two liaison and logistics officers, 12 field surveyors, and one data coding and data cleaning officer. Three supervisors were designated predominantly responsible for the oversight of the field surveyors and IDI individual interviews and FGDs.

1.3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Methods

The study team used qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection, divided into the following six methods:

A. Qualitative Methods:

- **Desk Research:** The team reviewed NGOs, and research documents, reports, and articles on IDPs issues, particularly related to the three governorates: Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin.
- **Site Visits and Observations:** The team conducted site visits to districts, sub-districts, and villages to observe routine activities and IDP livelihoods, and their original community areas.
- **IDIs:** The team conducted interviews with a range of individuals, officials, report authors, and stakeholders knowledgeable about IDPs issues within the three governorates using the IDI guide ([Annex 3](#)).

- **FGDs:** The team conducted targeted semi-structured discussions in single-stakeholder groups, such as women, men, and community leaders in IDP locations and their community areas.

B. Quantitative Methods:

- **Institutional Data:** The team collected statistical and textual information from organizations, such as the IOM and the Iraq Central Statistics Organization (CSO).
- **Surveys:** A survey questionnaire was administered electronically (working online and offline – MDC) to random stakeholders (households) in seven villages – [Annex 2](#).

1.3.2 Data Collection

The study team collected data on two groups:

1. Internally Displaced Persons (a sample of the 3% of IDPs in Iraq); and
2. Community (people from their AoO – a sample of the 12% of returnees in Iraq; and people who never left the location).

The study team conducted field surveys in five governorates: Anbar, Erbil, Duhok, Nineveh, and Salahaddin. Erbil and Duhok were included because many IDPs are living in camps in these two governorates (Figure 2). The sampling of individuals was based upon the location of IDPs, people from the area of origin (community), and people from all backgrounds.



Figure 2: Map of the Five Areas Surveyed (Kobotoolbox Map)

At the start of the field phase, the study team met to familiarize each other with the aims, objectives, expectations, and to prepare the itinerary and logistics. [Annex 1](#) includes an itinerary and timeline of the Field Phase. The study team collected data by interviewing governorate officials and prominent persons from the designated locations, using the IDI and FGD guides. Based on these interviews, the team revised the interview guide and validated the survey questions.

1.3.3 Sample Size: Survey

Table 1 shows the survey sample of 426 interviewees from three governorates. The households (HHs) were randomly selected from the three main areas (Anbar – Jazira Al-Khalidiya; Nineveh – Khana Sor; and Salahaddin – Balad) using the stratified random sampling method.

The survey comprised 49% female respondents and 51% of male respondents, with a mean age of 39.5 years (39 years for women, 40 years for men).

Table 1: Survey Sample Size by Governorate and Place of Residency (IDP or Community)

Governorates	IDP		Community		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Anbar	69	28.4%	62	33.9%	131	30.8%
Sinjar/Nineveh	59	24.3%	62	33.9%	121	28.4%
Salahaddin	115	47.3%	59	32.2%	174	40.8%
Total	243	100.0%	183	100.0%	426	100.0%

1.3.4 Sample Size: IDI and FGD

Table 2 shows the IDI and FGD sample of 96 individuals. A judgement (purposive) non-random sampling was used to select stakeholders. The study team conducted 37 IDI interviews (22 with IDPs, 15 with community members) and seven FGDs with a total of 60 participants (2 FGDs for each of Anbar and Nineveh, and 3 for Salahaddin).

Table 2: IDI and FGD Sample Size by Governorate and Place of Residency (IDP or Community)

Governorates	No. of IDIs		No. of FGDs	
	IDP	Community	IDP	Community
Anbar	7	5	1	1
Sinjar/Nineveh	9	5	1	1
Salahaddin	6	5	2	1
Total	22	15	4	3
	37 individuals		60 individuals	

2. SAFE RETURN AND REINTEGRATION OF IDPS

2.1 Displacement Wave in Anbar, Nineveh and Salahaddin

Iraq witnessed a significant number of IDPs in 2014 due to ISg taking control of large parts of the country. Due to conflicts and violence, the world's overall number of IDPs is estimated to be at 48 million, with 1.2 million IDPs in Iraq, making Iraq home to 2.5% of the global number of IDPs to 2020.²³

It is important to note that the displacement information in Figure 3 in this section is **within** the three governorates, not displacements **from** these three governorates **to** other locations in Iraq. The total displacements in the three governorates is about 944,000: Anbar has about 135,000 (14.3%); Nineveh has 669,000 (70.9%); and Salahaddin has 140,000 (14.8%).

Figure 3 shows the waves of displacement in the three governorates from 2014, coinciding with ISg's movement and control.

The first wave occurred in 2014. The second wave occurred in Anbar and Salahaddin governorates in 2015, earlier than Nineveh, which occurred in 2016 after the spread of violence onto the Nineveh plains.

Pre-June 2014, most individuals were displaced in Anbar governorate. Post-2016, the majority of people were displaced in Nineveh as ISg took over the city of Nineveh.

In Anbar governorate, more than 36% of people were displaced as they fled ISg in 2014. More than 30% of people were displaced in 2015 in the second wave.²⁴

In Nineveh governorate in the first wave in 2014, over 54% of people were displaced. In 2015, there were only about 4% of displaced people. In the second wave in 2016, more than 37% of IDPs were displaced.




Figure 3: IDPs by Period of Displacement in Governorates of Displacement (Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin)

²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Global Internal Displacement Database, (Dec. 2021), <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>.

²⁴ According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data, September 2021; IOM Dataset Round 123, Number of IDPs and returnees (Master list datasets, Sep. 2021, (2/10/2021), <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList#Datasets>.

The vast majority of people displaced in 2014 were in Salahaddin as it accounts for almost 72% of total displacements. The second wave in 2015 accounted for more than 15% of total displacements. For Salahaddin, most of the displacements occurred from June to August 2014, post-September 2015, and April 2015 (Figure 3).

The complex and dynamic challenges resulting from multiple armed conflicts in the areas has led to a weakening of the state of returnees, and the rule of law in Iraq, affecting community safety and security. As a result, multiple actors with varying degrees of accountability have filled this security void creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability. In addition, entities with the legitimate mandate to protect communities, such as the police, are not perceived as trustworthy due to decades of being used as an instrument of state oppression rather than serving the community.

To understand the current situation in the three governorates, the survey team observed the situation on the ground, such as the security and safety situation, coupled with the documented situation, such as the returnee index.

In Anbar, the current situation is that over 1.5 million displaced people have returned to the governorate. This can be linked to the closure of many camps by Gol. According to the DTM Iraq, districts such as Al-Ramadi and Al-Falluja have the highest number of returnees living under severe conditions. Many houses in the governorate are still destroyed with families unable to rebuild. In some areas in Anbar, such as Jazira Al-Khalidiya and Al-Qaim, there are check points controlled by other security actors, resulting in various violent situations during the year. Safety has generally improved in Anbar governorate. However, concern exists as long as ISg is present in the neighboring desert on one side, and the non-local security forces are present on the other side.

In Nineveh to 2021, over 1.9 million displaced people have returned. Among the returnees, over 1,000,000 returned to Mosul district: 360,000 of them returned to Telafar, 169,000 returned to Al-Hamdaniya, and 120,000 to Sinjar. The population of Nineveh is divided by different ethnic groups such as Arab, Kurd, Shabak, Yazidi, and Christians. There are different security actors present, especially in Sinjar. The recent Turkish bombing on PKK in Sinjar, and the present tension between the PKK army and the Iraqi army, make the security situation more vulnerable.

In Salahaddin, the current situation is that over 731,000 individuals have returned to the governorate. The main three areas of return are Tikrit, Al-Shirqat, and Baiji. The total number of returnees in Tikrit is 189,000, with 162,000 in Al-Shirqat, and 121,000 in Baiji. In Balad district, the total number of returnees is about 70,000 individuals. The security situation in the areas remains critical because ISg is still present in some locations. The current security actors are ISF, PMF, tribal forces, and Sunni mobilization forces (belonging to PMF).²⁵

²⁵ IOM-DTM, Return dynamics in Salahaddin governorate, July 2020, https://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/ReturnIndex/2020722736598_iom_dtm_Return_Dynamics_In_Salah_al_Din_Jul2020.pdf.

2.2 Current Displacement Index in Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin

Escalating safety and security in Iraq caused 6 million IDPs across the country from 2014 to 2021.²⁶ People mostly fled to other governorates, especially in the KRI areas. Now, over 1.18 million people are still displaced across the country and, according to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Iraq, more than 4.9 million people have returned to their areas.²⁷ Iraqi authorities closed many displacement camps between 2017 and 2019, but the current number of IDPs still remains high. Almost 350,000 individuals are still displaced in the three governorates (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Number of IDPs by Governorate of Displacement in 2021

The majority of displaced people are from Nineveh, which has over 73% of total displacements. There are 17% from Salahaddin and Anbar has 10% of total displacements. IDPs from Anbar mainly displaced to Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Baghdad, and Basrah. Nineveh IDPs are displaced to Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Duhok, Diyala, inside Nineveh, and Najaf. IDPs from Salahaddin are located in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Diyala.

2.3 Overview of the IDP Situation in Camps in the Three Governorates

In Iraq, there were many IDP and refugee camps, but the GoI has recently attempted to close most of them, saying that the security, political, and economic situations have improved. To January 2021, the GoI dismantled 14 formal IDP camps or classified them as informal sites: one camp in Anbar, three in Baghdad, three in Diyala, one in Kerbala, two in Kirkuk, three in Nineveh, and one in Salahaddin.²⁸

Based upon the recent information of the GoI and migration and displacement officials in the governorates, the remaining camps will be closed soon. During the study team's site visit of the camps, IDPs said that the camps' administrative officials would start cutting off their basic services. It is possible to close the two largest camps still operational in Amiriyat Alsmud (Amiriyat Al-Falluja) in Anbar, which house 2,800 people, and Jad'ah 5 in Nineveh, which houses approximately 2,000 people.²⁹ Twenty-five of

²⁶ Reliefweb, Exiled at Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarian consequences, June 2021,

<https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/exiled-home-internal-displacement-resulted-armed-conflict-iraq-and-its-humanitarian>

²⁷ According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data, September 2021; IOM Dataset Round 123, Number of IDPs and returnees (Master list datasets, Sep. 2021, (2/10/2021), <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList#Datasets>..

²⁸ Reliefweb, Iraq humanitarian needs overview, March 2021,

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Iraq%20Humanitarian%20Needs%20Overview%20%28February%202021%29.pdf>

²⁹ SOSS real data from the field.

the 29 camps that are still operational are in KRG-controlled territory. The KRG does not plan to close these camps, which house roughly 180,000 IDPs, anytime soon.³⁰

The situation in the IDP camps inside the three governorates is severe, especially in Amiriyat Alsmud, Jad'ah 1, Jad'ah 5, Khazir, Hasan Sham, and Mihatat Balad (informal camp). IDPs are complaining about the lack of aid, basic services, and health services, as well as the occasional curfew inside the camp, threats to evict them from the camp, and being expelled from the camp. At the same time, camps in KRI are more comfortable and the government cares more about the IDPs. For example, Essian camp looks like a large village full of life, as if the IDPs are living in their own home.



Essian Camp in Duhok

The GoI must take into consideration various factors when considering the return of IDPs from the camps to their AoO, such as the reasons, the living conditions, and the political, security, and economic status of the location of destination. In this study, the team reviewed the factors and reasons for IDP return.

2.4 Al-Hol Camp in Syria

Al-Hol (or Al-Hawl) camp is an official refugee camp in Hasaka governorate, Syria, that in December 2021 housed approximately 60,000 refugees and IDPs from several countries, primarily Iraq and Syria.³¹ The United Nations (UN), indicates that there are more than 30,900 Iraqi refugees living in Al-Hol camp.

It first opened in the 1990s as a small camp for displaced Iraqis, but in April 2014 it re-opened. In early 2019, a last struggle raged between US-backed forces and followers of the ISg. Arrested criminals were sent to jail and their families were brought to Al-Hol camp (mostly women and children under 12 years of age).

³⁰ Reliefweb, Exiled at Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarian consequences, June 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/exiled-home-internal-displacement-resulted-armed-conflict-iraq-and-its-humanitarian>

³¹ RUSAW, www.rudaw.net, dated 15 December 2021. Syrian refugee kille in al-Hol as murders surge at camp.

NGOs administrate and manage the camp. It is also run by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which requested foreign countries, particularly Iraq, to repatriate their residents.^{32,33,34}

The UN states that people in Al-Hol camp face a lack of sufficient accommodation, food, sanitation, education opportunities, health care, and legal processes, as well as insecurity and widespread violence, all of which have been compounded by the COVID-19 outbreak.³⁵

Al-Hol camp has become increasingly hazardous and desolate, where more than 70 people have been killed. Religious militancy is on the upswing, putting others who aren't as fervent in their beliefs in jeopardy. Hard-line women are frequently accused of killings, claiming that insecurity allows them to impose their rules and settle scores. AANES officials say security sweeps to collect pistols, knives, and other weapons have made no impact.³⁶

The Iraqi authorities stated that several Iraqi families in Al-Hol have been transported to the Jad'ah 1 camp in Al-Qayyarah district in Mosul governorate, which has been certified for repatriation.³⁷ The camp is very sensitive and the security forces do not allow anyone to enter it even if they have permission.

3. FINDINGS

3.1 Demographic Results of Survey Respondents

The study team conducted a survey with 243 (57%) IDP respondents in the camps and 183 (43%) respondents of the communities in their AoO (Anbar: Jazira Al-Khalidiya; Nineveh: Khana Sor/Sinjar; and Salahaddin: Balad).

The percentage of males and females selected for the survey was approximately the same in all three locations, except for Salahaddin (53.4% males, 47% females). The gender distribution of survey respondents for IDPs and community members in each of the three governorates is presented in Table 3. The average age of the IDP and community respondents was 41 years in Anbar and Salahaddin, and 36 years in Nineveh.

³² Reliefweb, Camp Profile - Al Hol, Al-Hasakeh governorate, Syria, Sep. 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/camp-profile-al-hol-al-hasakeh-governorate-syria-september-2021>.

³³ Rudaw media network, Al-Hol's 27,00 children in unbearable conditions: charities, Dec. 2021, <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/03122021>.









³⁴ Louisa Loveluck, Syrian detention camp rocked by dozens of killings blamed on Islamic State women, The Washington post, Sept. 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/19/syria-isis-al-hol-camp/>.

³⁵ UN news, UN launches initiative to support returnees trapped in Syria camps, Sept. 2021, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1101652>.

³⁶ Louisa Loveluck, Syrian detention camp rocked by dozens of killings blamed on Islamic State women, The Washington post, Sept. 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/19/syria-isis-al-hol-camp/>.

³⁷ The new humanitarian, Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria's Al-Hol camp, June, 2021, (11/11/2021), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/6/7/Iraqi-repatriations-Syria-al-Hol-camp-fear>.

Table 3: Survey Demographics

		Anbar (N=131)		Nineveh (N=121)		Salahaddin (N=174)	
		IDP	Community	IDP	Community	IDP	Community
	Male	50.7%	48.4%	52.5%	46.8%	52.2%	55.9%
	Female	49.3%	51.6%	47.5%	53.2%	47.8%	44.1%
	Illiterate	42.0%	12.9%	27.1%	22.6%	45.2%	3.4%
	Primary School Graduate	37.7%	46.8%	30.5%	30.6%	33.0%	25.4%
	Basic School Graduate	13.0%	9.7%	18.6%	16.1%	12.2%	11.9%
	High School Graduate	2.9%	8.1%	13.6%	14.5%	5.2%	11.9%
	Technical Institute	0.0%	1.6%	8.5%	4.8%	1.7%	11.9%
	Bachelor's Degree or Higher	4.3%	21.0%	1.7%	11.3%	2.6%	35.6%
	Single	7.2%	16.1%	32.2%	33.9%	4.3%	6.8%
	Married	79.7%	77.4%	57.6%	58.1%	75.7%	83.1%
	Widowed	10.1%	6.5%	6.8%	6.5%	12.2%	10.2%
	Divorced	2.9%	0.0%	1.7%	1.6%	6.1%	0.0%
	Separated	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%
	Other	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Worker	34.8%	17.7%	23.7%	25.8%	33.0%	18.6%
	Housewife	50.7%	41.9%	32.2%	14.5%	45.2%	22.0%
	Unemployed (Jobless)	1.4%	4.8%	13.6%	12.9%	10.4%	6.8%
	Student	1.4%	4.8%	11.9%	4.8%	3.5%	0.0%
	Other	11.6%	30.6%	18.6%	41.9%	7.8%	52.5%
	Other	11.6%	30.6%	18.6%	41.9%	7.8%	52.5%
	0 – 100,000 IQD	47.8%	16.1%	49.2%	24.2%	43.5%	10.2%
	100,001 – 250,000 IQD	37.7%	33.9%	32.2%	17.7%	27.8%	15.3%
	250,001 - 750,000 IQD	11.6%	41.9%	16.9%	46.8%	26.1%	32.2%
	750,001 – 1,250,000 IQD	1.4%	4.8%	0.0%	9.7%	2.6%	27.1%
	1,250,00 + IQD	1.4%	3.2%	1.7%	1.6%	0.0%	15.3%
	1 - 3	17.4%	9.7%	10.2%	11.3%	21.7%	13.6%
	4 - 6	43.5%	46.8%	44.1%	37.1%	31.3%	49.2%
	7 - 9	36.2%	33.9%	30.5%	24.2%	30.4%	32.2%
	9 +	2.9%	9.7%	15.3%	27.4%	16.5%	5.1%
	18 - 27	14.5%	19.4%	28.8%	32.3%	16.5%	5.1%
	28 - 37	17.4%	27.4%	25.4%	30.6%	27.8%	28.8%
	38 - 46	31.9%	21.0%	28.8%	17.7%	23.5%	33.9%
	47 - 56	27.5%	16.1%	10.2%	8.1%	22.6%	18.6%
	56+	8.7%	16.1%	6.8%	11.3%	9.6%	13.6%
	Years spent in the camp/community - Mean	3.46	36.03	6.91	3.67	3.87	31.66

The majority of both IDP and community members surveyed are married (between 76%-82% in Anbar and Salahaddin, and 58% in Nineveh). Therefore, the highest percentage of single people is in Nineveh (32% of IDPs and 34% of community).

The size of IDP HHs is 4–6 individuals: 44% in Anbar, 44% in Nineveh, and 31% in Salahaddin. For the surveyed community members, the HH size is also 4–6 individuals: 47% in Anbar, 37% in Nineveh, and 49% in Salahaddin. For both IDPs and communities, about a third of HHs have 7-9 individuals, except in Nineveh where 24% of community members have a HH size of 7-9 individuals and 27% have more than nine individuals. In comparison, 3%-17% of all other HHs have over nine individuals (Table 5).

Most IDPs in Anbar (42%) and Salahaddin (45%) are illiterate, which is significantly higher than in Nineveh where 27% are illiterate. Community members are significantly more literate than IDPs in Anbar (13% illiterate) and Salahaddin (3% illiterate), and about the same in Nineveh (27% illiterate IDPs and 23% illiterate community members).

The percentage of IDPs who have completed primary school is about the same across the three governorates: 38% in Anbar, 31% in Nineveh, and 33% in Salahaddin. More community members have completed primary school than IDPs in Anbar, but not in Nineveh and Salahaddin: 47% in Anbar, 31% in Nineveh, and 25% in Salahaddin. Therefore, education levels are low for both IDPs and community.

More IDPs are working than are jobless: Anbar – 35% working and 1% jobless; Nineveh – 24% working and 14% jobless; Salahaddin – 33% working and 10% jobless. The remaining are students or homeworkers: 51% housewives in Anbar, 32% housewives in Nineveh, and 45% housewives in Salahaddin. Fewer community members than IDPs are working, except in Nineveh where the percentages have parity: Anbar – 18% working and 5% jobless; Nineveh – 26% working and 13% jobless; Salahaddin – 19% working and 7% jobless. Unlike IDPs, the remaining are students, homeworkers, or ‘other’ category (where ‘other’ is predominantly self-employed): 42% housewives and 31% ‘other’ in Anbar, 15% housewives and 42% ‘other’ in Nineveh, and 22% housewives and 53% ‘other’ in Salahaddin. The community respondents who live in Jazira Al-Khalidiya, Kana Sor, and Balad have more opportunities to work in the education sector, medicine, or self-employment.

The monthly income of most IDP HHs does not exceed 250,000 IQD (about USD\$170): 86% in Anbar, 81% in Nineveh, and 71% in Salahaddin. The HH income for the community is much better than for IDPs, at up to 750,000 IQD (about USD\$515) per month: 92% in Anbar, 89% in Nineveh, and 58% in Salahaddin.

The analyses and tables for all statistics are presented in [Annex 4](#) and [Annex 5](#).

Table 4 presents the main differences among the three areas (Jazira Al-Khalidiya, Khana Sor, Balad) in terms of the safe return and reintegration of IDPs.

Table 4: Comparison of Three Designated Areas of Origin (AoO) on the Safe Return and Reintegration of IDPs

Questions	ANBAR Jazira Al-Khalidiya/Al-Habbaniya	NINEVEH Khana Sor/Sinjar	SALAHADDIN Balad
Sect	Sunni	Yazidi	Shi'i (inside Balad) & Sunni (surrounding Balad)
Income (sources)	Public paid job, agriculture & livestock, Informal commerce, pensions	Public paid job, private paid job, agriculture & livestock, informal commerce	Public paid job, agriculture & livestock, informal commerce, pensions
Returnees	100,000 returnees of Al-Ramadi district	120,000 returnees of Sinjar district	70,000 returnees of Balad district
Formal IDPs by displacement district	7,000 IDPs in Al-Ramadi district	37,000 IDPs in Sinjar district	4,000 IDPs in Balad district
Family Size (average)	6.7 persons	7.3 persons	6.1 persons

Questions	ANBAR Jazira Al-Khalidiya/Al-Habbaniya	NINEVEH Khana Sor/Sinjar	SALAHADDIN Balad
Years spent in camp (average)	3.5 years	6.9 years	3.9 years
Who hinders IDP's return?	26% of IDPs due to tribal leaders, mobilization forces, ISF	14% of IDPs due to security situation, ISF	29% of IDPs due to ISF, PMF, land occupiers
Attraction for IDPs to STAY in displaced location (main reasons) rather than returning	Displaced location: good security, job Area of Origin: lack of jobs, housing problem	Displaced location: good security, job Area of Origin: lack of security & services	Displaced location: good security, job, services Area of Origin: lack of jobs, security & services
Attraction for IDPs to RETURN (main reasons)	Housing availability, safe location, emotional desire to return, job opportunities	Emotional desire to return, job opportunities, housing availability, safe location	Emotional desire to return, safe location, housing availability, job opportunities
Factors contribute to IDPs safe return	Compensation for destroyed property (96%), Good economic conditions (93%), Increased livelihoods (93%), Improved security (89%), Basic services (87%), Unification of security leaders (87%), Supporting agriculture & livestock (83%), Decreased military checkpoints (69%)	Compensation for destroyed property (97%), Improved security (95%), Basic services (94%), Supporting agriculture & livestock (92%), Increased livelihoods (92%), Good economic conditions (85%), Unification of security leaders (86%), Decreased military checkpoints (79%)	Increased livelihoods (98%), Compensation for destroyed property (97%), Good economic conditions (97%), Supporting agriculture & livestock (95%), Basic services (94%), Improved security (92%), Unification of security leaders (75%), Decreased military checkpoints (67%)
Economic status of HH (compared to 1 year ago)	Stated Worse: 40% of HHs	Stated Worse: 40% of HHs	Stated Worse: 68% of HHs
Basic needs of returnees in AoO	Provide or renovate house, Job opportunities, Health centers, Government or INGO support for agriculture & livestock, Water, Electricity	Provide or renovate house, Job opportunities, Health centers, Provide or renovate schools, Government support, Government or INGO support for agriculture & livestock, Water, Electricity, Security	Provide or renovate house, Job opportunities, Health centers, Government or INGO support for agriculture & livestock, Provide or renovate schools, Government support, Water, Electricity, Security
Status of POLITICAL situation in AoO	Perception Poor: 14% of respondents	Perception Poor: 65% of respondents	Perception Poor: 35% of respondents
Status of SECURITY situation in AoO	Perception Poor: 5% of respondents	Perception Poor: 37% of respondents	Perception Poor: 23% of respondents
Status of ADMINISTRATIVE situation in AoO	Perception Poor: 19% of respondents	Perception Poor: 57% of respondents	Perception Poor: 63% of respondents
Status of HEALTH situation in AoO	Perception Poor: 28% of respondents	Perception Poor: 19% of respondents	Perception Poor: 61% of respondents
IDPs' return intention within the next 12 months	45% of IDPs	24% of IDPs	47% of IDPs
IDPs' have no intention to return	33% of IDPs	42% of IDPs	49% of IDPs

Questions	ANBAR Jazira Al-Khalidiya/Al-Habbaniya	NINEVEH Khana Sor/Sinjar	SALAHADDIN Balad
Main challenges for IDPs to overcome to safely return to AoO	Non-disbursement of compensation (69%), Lack of reconstruction (59%), Lack of livelihood opportunities (53%), Lack of services (32%)	Non-disbursement of compensation (63%), Lack of services (55%), Lack of livelihood opportunities (54%), Political conflicts (50%), Lack of reconstruction (47%), Sectarian conflicts (37%), Don't trust the government to provide security (35%)	Non-disbursement of compensation (70%), Lack of reconstruction (61%), Lack of livelihood opportunities (53%), Lack of services (45%), Political conflicts (33%)


3.2 Average Number of Years in the Camps

The average number of years that IDPs have spent in the camps is 3.5 years in Anbar, 7 years in Nineveh, and 4 years in Salahaddin. Most of Nineveh IDP respondents were from Khana Sor/Sinjar, where they were displaced from 2014 until the present time. Anbar and Salahaddin respondents have been in the camps since 2017 approximately. The average number of years that surveyed community members have been in their AoO is 36 years in Anbar, 4 years in Nineveh, and 32 years in Salahaddin (Table 4). All community members from Khana Sor were returnees, but in Anbar and Salahaddin, they were returnees and community residents.

It was evident to the study team, in discussions during the IDIs and FGDs, that the GoI is intending and starting to close all the camps in all governorates except KRI. KRG has no plans to close the camps in the governorates under its control. At the time of writing this report, Iraqi authorities are attempting to expel IDPs from the camps through whatever means possible.

3.3 Opportunities for Safe Return

According to the DTM, about 80% of IDPs returned between 2016-2017. However,



there were post-crisis returns³⁸ mostly related to the reconstruction of the economic and physical situation as well as improvement of security and safety.³⁹

According to the study team’s survey data, respondents stated that the prime decision to return to their AoO is the availability of housing. The second reason is the safety of their AoO, and the third reason is their emotional desire to return. Having job opportunities is also a key reason to return. The role of humanitarian groups or the government to support them in return is considered to be a less important factor for their decision to return (Figure 5).

Table 5 shows the comparison between locations for the most important reasons to return to their AoO. For people in Jazira Al-Khalidiya in Anbar, the IDP’s main reasons for return are housing availability, safety and security, availability of services, emotional desire to return, and job opportunities. For people in Khana Sor/Sinjar in Nineveh, job opportunities and the emotional desire to return are the main reasons, above the availability of housing, and safety and security. The reasons for IDPs returning to their AoO in Balad in Salahaddin include emotional desire to return, safety and security, job opportunities, and joining family that have already returned. Therefore, IDP’s reasons to return to Balad are slightly different to the other two locations.

Table 5: Reasons to IDPs’ Return to the Area of Origin (AoO)

Response	Anbar		Sinjar/Nineveh		Salahaddin	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Base	131		121		174	
The location must be safe	71	54.2%	40	33.1%	58	33.3%
Availability of housing	98	32.5%	41	33.9%	52	29.9%
Availability of services (for example, education and health)	24	7.9%	11	9.1%	20	11.5%
Availability of jobs	30	9.9%	42	34.7%	42	24.1%
Availability of assistance	5	1.7%	6	5.0%	8	4.6%
Emotional desire to return	37	12.3%	42	34.7%	73	42.0%
To join family members already returned	17	5.6%	16	13.2%	35	20.1%
Incentives to return by humanitarian actors	2	0.7%	4	3.3%	14	8.0%
Incentives/support to return by government authorities	3	1.0%	1	0.8%	11	6.3%
Encouragement to return by community/religious leaders	6	2.0%	9	7.4%	33	19.0%
Return due to employment (salaries from social care, affiliates and government employees)	1	0.3%	5	4.1%	14	8.0%
Availability of financial support	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	6	3.4%
No one has returned because of the security situation	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	5	2.9%
Don’t Know (DK)	7	2.3%	12	9.9%	16	9.2%
Prefer not to respond	1	0.3%	1	0.8%	1	0.6%

There are differences among IDP and community respondents regarding the reasons why families have returned. For safety reasons, over 28% of respondents are from community members while only 9% of IDPs think that safety is a critical reason to return.

Both IDPs and community members almost equally think housing availability is a critical reason to return. Emotional desire to return was also important for community and IDPs (23% and 10% respectively).

³⁸ Post-crisis return means returns that happened after the official end of the crisis in December 2017.

³⁹ IOM, An overview of return movements in Iraq (DTM Integrated Location Assessment V, 2020), 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20213221940805_iom_DTM_ILAV_An_Overview_of_Return_in_Iraq_0.pdf.

Study IDI and FGD participants indicated that:

“Returnees can move freely within their governorates if their security file is clear. However, some claim that there is a curfew in some places from six in the evening until six in the morning, and that while crossing from checks, there are armed actors who demand money. So, we are not free to move, and this is due to the hegemony of the armed actors that are higher than the government’s authority.”

Regarding whether returnees were treated normally, one IDI participant in Anbar stated that:

“Everyone is treated normally, but some suffer from complications in their psychological state as a result of their displacement and what they suffered during that period. Everyone is welcome here, except for those families whose sons belonged to ISGs. These families are required to disassociate with that person in order to return and for society to accept them. Otherwise, they will not be allowed to return. This condition avoids corruption, sedition, and revenge.”

Over 21% of IDPs responded that having job opportunities is their reason to return, while only 6% of community members stated this reason. About 8% of IDPs said that they do not have information about why families are returning (Figure 6).




Figure 6: Factors for the Return of Families by Community and IDP Type (%)

In-depth interviews and FGDs were conducted in Anbar, Nineveh, Salahaddin and in camps in Erbil and Duhok governorates to understand what the opportunities are in relation to the safe return and reintegration of IDPs in their AoO. Government authorities of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin have said

that they welcome families who were displaced, but only on the condition that their families did not belong to ISg.

The study team observed and questioned the relationship between returnees and people already residing in the area to note whether people were living together peacefully. According to the survey results, more than 67% of participants described the relationship between returnees and other residents of the AoO as very good or good, and over 13% described the relationship as moderate. Only 4% of participants described the relationship as bad or very bad, mostly stated by IDPs in Salahaddin (Figure 7). Generally, therefore, this means that people residing in the community have no issues with returnees. They can socially interact with each other. According to the FGD in Jazira Al-Khalidiya in Anbar, the participants rejected, and expressed anger about the return of IDPs who were engaged with ISg.

Table 6 shows the relationship between returnees and other residents of the AoO to determine any variation between locations. Most of the participants, regardless of the location, stated that the relationship between returnees and the community is either good or very good. More than 70% of participants in Anbar, and 65% of participants in both Nineveh and Salahaddin, stated that the relationship is good or very good. Only 3% of participants in Anbar, 5% of participants in Nineveh, and 4% of participants in Salahaddin stated that the relationship is poor or very poor, mainly due to revenge attacks, as well as political and security tensions. More than 15% of respondents (most IDPs) do not have information about the relationship between returnees and the community. This indicates that IDPs may have little information about their areas of origin.




Figure 7: Relationship between Returnees and People Reside in the Area

Table 6: The Relationship between Returnees and Other Residents in the Areas of Origin (AoO)

Response	Anbar	Sinjar/Nineveh	Salahaddin
Very poor	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%
Poor	3.1%	4.1%	4.0%
Moderate	11.5%	13.2%	14.4%
Good	56.5%	34.7%	37.4%
Very Good	13.7%	34.7%	27.6%
Don't Know	15.3%	12.4%	16.7%

In Jazira Al-Khalidiya in Anbar, according to the IDI and FGD results, factors affecting the safe return of IDPs include the provision of security by a strong security apparatus and not several security agencies, unifying the security leaders, applying justice to all, eliminating ISg remnants, providing a decent livelihood such as housing, electricity, drinking water networks, and irrigation, in addition to opportunities for education, work, health centres, and the like.

In Khana Sor in Nineveh, factors affecting the safe return of IDPs include security and adequate health service provision, restoration of demolished homes, the provision of transport for their children to get to school in the winter, street repairs, water, electricity, and humanitarian organizations' support.

In Balad in Salahaddin, the main factors affecting the safe return of IDPs include security and safety, building and renovating homes, and supporting livelihoods, especially agriculture and the reclamation of agricultural land.

3.4 Barriers to Safe Return

Displaced people started to return after the military campaign to retake areas under ISg control. The IDPs were driven by expectations of stability. For this reason, more than 4.9 million IDPs have already returned to their locations. The IDPs' ability to return home is hindered by their extended absence, which is compounded by unresolved inter-group relations and increased concerns about ISg's revival.⁴⁰

The challenges that IDPs must overcome in order to return are similar in all three locations, especially among community members.

For Anbar, the main challenge is the lack of compensation, which accounts for 75% of surveyed community members and 64% of IDPs. The second challenge is the lack of construction development, followed by the lack of livelihood opportunities and the lack of services.

For Nineveh, the challenges include the lack of compensation (58% of communities and 68% of IDPs), political conflicts, the lack of services, sectarian conflicts, and the lack of reconstruction. About 63% of IDPs stated that the current political conflict between different parties in the area made them remain displaced. Additionally, 53% of them said that sectarian conflict has negatively affected their decision to return (Table 7).

For Salahaddin, the main obstacles for return include the lack of compensation (69.5% of communities and 69.5% of IDPs), the lack of reconstruction development, the lack of livelihood opportunities, the lack of services, political conflicts, and that citizens do not trust the government to provide security (12% of communities and 34% of IDPs). The political conflicts and distrust between people and security forces are two challenges that appeared in the survey results, IDIs and FGDs in Balad district in Salahaddin.


Table 7: IDPs Main Challenges and Obstacles for the Safe Return of IDPs to their Area of Origin (AoO)

Response	Anbar				Sinjar/Nineveh				Salahaddin			
	IDP		Community		IDP		Community		IDP		Community	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Base	69		62		59		62		115		59	
Non-disbursement of compensation	44	63.8%	46	75.4%	40	67.8%	36	58.1%	80	69.6%	41	69.5%
Lack of reconstruction in the devastated areas	37	53.6%	40	65.6%	29	49.2%	28	45.2%	73	63.5%	33	55.9%
IDPs not possessing required ID documents because of losing, non-availability, or expiration.	2	2.9%	4	6.6%	2	3.4%	4	6.5%	16	13.9%	19	32.2%
Citizens distrust the government in providing security	8	11.6%	10	16.4%	24	40.7%	18	29.0%	39	33.9%	7	11.9%
Sectarian conflicts	4	5.8%	4	6.6%	31	52.5%	14	22.6%	17	14.8%	3	5.1%
Political conflicts	3	4.3%	4	6.6%	37	62.7%	24	38.7%	35	30.4%	22	37.3%
The family head is a woman who cannot support her family	5	7.2%	10	16.4%	0	0.0%	7	11.3%	6	5.2%	12	20.3%
Lack of livelihood opportunities	34	49.3%	35	57.4%	31	52.5%	35	56.5%	62	53.9%	30	50.8%
Lack of services	16	23.2%	26	42.6%	36	61.0%	31	50.0%	43	37.4%	36	61.0%
Unavailability of housing	3	4.3%	5	8.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Reverages, enmities and tribe problems	5	7.2%	1	1.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

⁴⁰ IOM, An overview of return movements in Iraq (DTM Integrated Location Assessment V, 2020), 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20213221940805_iom_DTM_ILAV_An_Overview_of_Return_in_Iraq_0.pdf.

Response	Anbar				Sinjar/Nineveh				Salahaddin			
	IDP		Community		IDP		Community		IDP		Community	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Base	69		62		59		62		115		59	
Don't Know (DK)	1	1.4%	0	0.0%	2	3.4%	4	6.5%	6	5.2%	3	5.1%
I prefer not to respond	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.9%	0	0.0%

According to the correspondence analysis of the relationship between the location of the respondents and the main challenges and obstacles for the safe return of IDPs to their AoO, the challenges appear to fall into two distinct categories. The first category relates to security considerations and the second to the sustainable livelihood of the people in the AoO (Figure 8). The first category pertains mostly to Nineveh and Salahaddin, while the second category pertains to Anbar. As seen in Figure 8, political conflicts and public mistrust in the government's ability to provide security are associated with Nineveh and Salahaddin areas, whereas sectarian conflict is primarily associated with Nineveh and then Salahaddin areas.



The study team explored whether IDPs and community have information about their AoO. Almost 61% of IDPs and 78% of the community stated that they have information. Those with knowledge described the situation in terms of feeling poor or good about different situations, such as economic, political, security, administrative, and health situations. More than 59% of people in Nineveh and Salahaddin (IDPs and community) declared that the economic situation is poor or very poor.

About 65% of participants in Khana Sor town in Nineveh rated the political situation as poor or very poor. More than 64% in Balad in Salahaddin said the administrative situation is poor or very poor, with 57% in Khana Sor stating that it is poor or very poor.

Participants rated the health situation as poor or very poor: about 61% in Khana Sor and 49% in Balad. However, in Anbar, respondents feel that the health situation is better than the other two governorates (Figure 9).

In general, IDPs are more pessimistic than community members in their AoO about all of the five situations – economic, political, security, administrative, and health.




Figure 9: Respondents Description of the Poor Situation in the AoO

3.4.1 Access to Basic Needs

Access to livelihoods and employment, rebuilding houses, and the provision of basic services, such as water, electricity, and health can contribute positively to encouraging the safe return of IDPs. All participants, regardless of the three locations, stated that renovating houses, job opportunities, and health centers are the main needs that they prefer to have access to in order to return to the AoO.

Accessibility and availability of water in Nineveh can be considered more important for IDPs to return. The availability of health services is more important for IDPs in Anbar. Participants in Salahaddin and Nineveh claimed that the provision of electricity and renovating schools are important factors that may lead to the return of IDPs to their AoO.


The role of government and INGOs is also considered to be an important factor in all locations. Over 37% of participants in Anbar, 34% in Nineveh, and 66% in Salahaddin stated that they need support from government and INGOs for agriculture and livestock (Table 8).

Table 8: The Most Important Basic Needs of Returnees in their Areas of Origin (AoO)

Response	Anbar		Sinjar/Nineveh		Salahaddin	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Base	62		62		59	
Providing and renovating houses	47	75.8%	46	74.2%	43	72.9%
Job Opportunities	47	75.8%	45	72.6%	40	67.8%
Health centers	36	58.1%	41	66.1%	31	52.5%
Providing water	20	32.3%	29	46.8%	23	39.0%
Providing electricity	15	24.2%	26	41.9%	24	40.7%
Providing and renovating schools	13	21.0%	37	59.7%	38	64.4%
Governmental support	8	12.9%	33	53.2%	30	50.8%
Providing security	8	12.9%	28	45.2%	18	30.5%
Reducing political tension (Political stability)	1	1.6%	14	22.6%	2	3.4%

Supporting agriculture and livestock by government or INGO	23	37.1%	21	33.9%	39	66.1%
Roads, bridges and street paving	4	6.5%	1	1.6%	0	0.0%
Don't Know (DK)	1	1.6%	1	1.6%	0	0.0%

One of the reasons for staying in the area of displacement rather than returning is that there is a good security in the area of displacement and lack of security in the area of origin (32%) and lack of political stability (3%) shown in Figure 10. The low response rate for the political stability issue might be attributed to respondents' fear of stating the truth in present of local forces in the area. According to the FGD results, IDP participants mentioned that the lack of basic services, such as education, water, electricity, affected their decision to return. These issues remain high in the AoO. According to the IDIs in Nineveh, the issues which affect their decision are basic services and the provision of schools. Among the most important issues and main problems related to basic services in the AoO include the non-existence or in limited supply of drinking water, food, health services, schools, teaching staff, electricity.



3.4.2 Security Challenges

Security challenges remain a major reason why IDPs are not willing to return. In general, the main reasons are the better security in the area of displacement (39%) and the lack of security in the AoO (36%), followed by the lack of political stability (8%). Over 76% of participants in Khana Sor in Nineveh stated that the lack of security prevented their return, due to the presence of different parties and armed groups in Sinjar and the Turkish Airforce bombing in the area.

One of the participants from IDIs in Jazira Al-Khalidiya stated that *“We cannot return to our areas because there are different forces and each one does not believe in the other and they accuse us of being with ISg.”*

Another one from Khana Sor stated that *“Yes, in general, we fear Turkish planes bombing us and large security actors in the area.”*

Across all governorates, more than 89% of participants (IDPs and community) agreed or strongly agreed that security needed to be improved, the security pursuit should be stopped, and military check points should be reduced, as well as the unification of security leaders (Table 9). This indicates that there are obstacles at the check points that stop people from returning. People in Khana Sor said security and safety are absent, especially due to the conflict between different forces in the area.

Table 9: Security Factors Affecting the Safe Return of IDPs

Factors	Anbar	Nineveh	Salahaddin
Improving security situation in the AoO	89.3%	95.0%	92.0%
Stopping of security pursuit and decreasing of military checkpoints	68.7%	79.3%	67.2%
Unification of security leaders	72.5%	86.0%	75.3%

Some people in Sinjar district were displaced for the second time due to the bombing in the mountains by a Turkish plane. Some people in Anbar and Nineveh stated that they were afraid of disordered attacks and remnants of the war in the AoO.

According to the FGD results, people are also concerned about the safety of their families. A FGD participant in Salahaddin stated that:

“I worry these days that the party holding the land has the ability to take it without informing the mayor or the sheikh. Also, these villages lack Iraqi police forces to protect us and the land.”

3.4.3 Sustainable Livelihood

Access to sustainable livelihoods continues to be an issue for IDPs. Having job opportunities and services are equally important for IDPs (Table 10). For IDPs in all locations, the lack of job opportunities in the AoO is one of the most important reasons for their decision not to return. Participants stated other reasons, such as housing issues, lack of humanitarian aid, and low economic conditions in AoO.

Table 10: The Availability of Employment and Livelihoods Associated with Safe Return to the AoO

Response	Anbar				Nineveh				Salahaddin			
	IDP		Community		IDP		Community		IDP		Community	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
YES	19	27.5%	51	82.3%	26	44.1%	35	56.5%	82	71.3%	45	76.3%
NO	28	40.6%	8	12.9%	19	32.2%	25	40.3%	7	6.1%	14	23.7%
Don't Know	22	31.9%	3	4.8%	14	23.7%	2	3.2%	26	22.6%	0	0.0%
Total	69	100.0%	62	100.0%	59	100.0%	62	100.0%	115	100.0%	59	100.0%

In Anbar, over 82% of community members and over 27% of IDPs stated that employment and livelihood remained an issue to enable them to reintegrate in their AoO (Table 10). More than 56% of community members and over 44% of IDPs in Nineveh also stated that the issue of employment and livelihood was associated with safe return. In Salahaddin, 76% of community and 71% of IDPs agreed. According to the FGD results in all the three locations, sustainable livelihoods such as job opportunities and in-kind grant access remained one of the most important issues that make IDPs return.

There are different sectors associated with the decision of returning to the AoO, such as food, health, and non-food items (NFIs). The issues associated with these sectors are more common in Salahaddin, meaning people in Salahaddin, including drinking water, education, health, housing, and livelihoods (Figure 11). The most critical issues for IDPs in Anbar are associated with livelihoods, health, and housing. For Nineveh, the issues are employment and livelihoods, drinking water, housing, and education.




Figure 11: Issues Associated with Sectors for Returnees

3.4.4 Housing and Infrastructure

Housing and infrastructure remain key issues among IDPs as well as returnees. The destruction of houses, land, and property is still a common issue preventing IDPs from returning.⁴¹ In Salahaddin, over 77% of IDPs and 53% of community members stated that housing and shelter is associated with not returning to the AoO (Table 11). However, this is not the case for Anbar participants, especially community members. The perception of IDPs and community members differ regarding housing and shelter in Nineveh. Community members in Nineveh thought that housing is not related to the decision to return to the area. However, 44% of IDPs from Nineveh stated that housing is still an issue affecting their decision to return. About 24% of IDPs did not have information about the housing problem in AoO.

Table 11: Shelter/Housing Problem Associated with Safe Return to the AoO

Response	Anbar				Sinjar/Nineveh				Salahaddin			
	IDP		Community		IDP		Community		IDP		Community	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
YES	21	30.4%	15	24.2%	26	44.1%	18	29.0%	89	77.4%	31	52.5%
NO	27	39.1%	45	72.6%	19	32.2%	43	69.4%	4	3.5%	28	47.5%
Don't Know	21	30.4%	2	3.2%	14	23.7%	1	1.6%	22	19.1%	0	0.0%
Total	69	100.0%	62	100.0%	59	100.0%	62	100.0%	115	100.0%	59	100.0%

In Salahaddin, according to the survey results, 69% of returnees stated that housing is an issue for return, followed by 36.4% of participants in Nineveh, and more than 27% in Anbar (Figure 12). Therefore, returnees in Anbar have slightly less concern about housing and shelter compared with returnees from other governorates. However, IDPs have more concerns about housing, where more than 77% of IDPs in Salahaddin declared that housing is an issue for return, followed by 44% in Nineveh and 30% in Anbar.




Figure 12: Issues Associated with Housing and Shelter for Returnees

Most of the housing issues concern ruined, destroyed, or burned homes and the lack of compensation and support to rebuild them.

3.4.5 Social Interaction

Regaining social interaction between returnees and people that reside in the area may require time. People may not interact in the same way that they did before the crisis. This is because some people may perceive that other families are in favor of ISg. IDI results indicated that all community members deal with returnees in a normal manner with mutual respect. However, those returnees who belong to a member of ISg are not welcomed. Those who have family members with ISg cannot return and are not welcomed by both security actors as well as the general community if these families do not disassociate from their family members who engaged with ISg. However, people who fled because of security fears are welcome to return.

⁴¹ Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights report about internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarian consequences, June 2021, <https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/4464/Exiled-At-Home:-Internal-displacement-resulted-from-the-armed-conflict-in-Iraq-and-its-humanitarian-consequences>.

According to the survey results, more than 26% of IDPs from Anbar and Salahaddin declared that they cannot return or are not allowed to return because of tribal leaders in Anbar; and ISF, armed actors, and land occupiers in Salahaddin. Also, the encouragement, or otherwise, of community and religious leaders has an influence on social cohesion within communities and decisions about returnees.

3.4.6 Political Situation

According to the survey results, the political situation is another important factor directly related to the safety and security of the community. The political situation remained stable in almost all areas of Anbar. However, there are major political issues in Khana Sor as there are different parties and armed actors. According to the survey results, over 62% of IDPs and 38% of community members in Nineveh stated that current political conflicts between the parties prevented IDPs from returning to their AoO. These issues led to people in Khana Sor in Sinjar district to be displaced for the second time because of the bombing in the mountains by a Turkish plane. There are political conflicts in Salahaddin as well, and over 30% of IDPs and 37% of community members stated that current political conflicts are present in the area.

According to the IDI interviews in Salahaddin:

“Some areas are controlled by a non-governmental body, which prevents families from returning, especially in Al-Farhatiya sub-district. Al-Farhatiya has two areas, one part with returnees, and one part that is absolutely forbidden to return to. The reason is the demographic change of approximately 160 houses, and it is near Mihatat Balad. Many had their homes and sources of livelihoods destroyed, and at the same time, they found jobs and good schools in a safe area of the displacement location.”

Most of the participants agreed that unification of security leaders can contribute positively to safe return. A total of 80% of IDPs in the three locations and 73% of community members agree, especially IDPs in Nineveh (96%) and IDPs in Salahaddin (80%). The security concerns and unification of leaders are extremely important to reduce the tension between different security actors.

The sectarian tensions and differences are hindering the return of IDPs according to the participants of the FGD in Erbil.

3.5 Role of INGO in Safe Return and Reintegration of IDPs

From 2014, as the humanitarian situation in Iraq increased, NGOs in and around the country were required to provide help and protection to IDPs. National NGOs and INGOs played a crucial role in encouraging safe return and reintegration of IDPs to the AoO, in addition to the governmental decision to shut down IDP camps across the country. Therefore, the number of IDPs decreased from 6 million to 1.2 million, and maybe 2022 will be much lower.

IDPs and communities are ready to present their redevelopment and aid development ideas to NGOs. Participants interviewed as part of this study suggested the following IDP needs and the roles that NGOs and INGOs could play:

1. Assistance with job opportunities and financial compensation because Iraq defended and fought “on behalf of the whole world against ISg.”
2. A decent life and the “simplest means of livelihood” to facilitate and encourage the voluntary return and restoration of normal life to the region.
3. International pressure on the Iraqi government to support community peace.
4. Reduced presence of armed actors to help in the return of the displaced to their AoO.
5. Programs that support farmers in terms of agriculture, livestock, and planting orchards.

6. Clean water in the community through supporting IDPs to establish water networking projects in Balad in Salahaddin and Jazira Al-Khalidiya area in Anbar.
7. Water rehabilitation projects.
8. Support for the return of widows, divorced women, minors, and people with special.
9. Women's empowerment through the establishment of NGO-supported vocational training courses.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has extensively covered various barriers and opportunities for the safe return of IDPs in the three locations in Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin. The findings can be used to support the needs for safe return. Thus, based on the team's triangulation of survey results, IDIs, FGDs, and other methods of data collection, the following are the most important conclusions and recommendations:

Conclusions and Recommendations

Two types of IDPs must be differentiated for safe return and reintegration: 1) IDPs who do not have the means to return, because their farms and homes have been occupied, and due to the lack of housing, livelihoods, and/or lost official documents, and 2) IDP households (HHs) where members had engaged with ISg, because AoO communities remain suspicious and unsupportive of these families.

Safety and Security: The security sector should be reformed and improved. For example, the security pursuit should be stopped, military checkpoints should be reduced, security leaders should be unified, and people from the same area should be chosen to help authorities avoid local tensions and conflicts.

Security can be considered one of the main barriers to a safe return, especially in Nineveh and Salahaddin, while in Anbar, tribal conflicts and revenge are considered to be the main security barriers. Thus, the government should provide a secure place for IDPs by not letting different forces or armed actors be present in the AoO. This can be done by retaining the power of local police in the areas of return. High numbers of security actors represent a greater barrier than lower numbers of actors. In Anbar and Nineveh, there are worries about the remnants of the war and environmental neglect.

With the exception of KRI, the Iraqi government closed several camps in the governorates. The Iraqi government through ministry of migration announced a national plan for the safe return of IDPs. IDPs are not ready to return unless security, tribal retribution, housing, employment opportunities, and access to basic services are resolved. People are fearful of a disordered attack on the camps, particularly in Anbar, where the camp has already been targeted.

Housing and Infrastructure: Since infrastructure and housing are main issues associated with safe return, shelter and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) support can work together to make sure that the key infrastructure is ready at the AoO. This can include:

- Provide support to rehabilitate damaged houses.
- Provide NFIs related to housings such as water tanks and kitchen supplies.
- Provide legal assistance to solve issues related to house, land, property issues, and the right of ownership.
- Support and encourage the governorates to provide IDPs with access to lost housing documents.

- Support resettlement for the households with appropriate compensation since some of the houses were destroyed or occupied by military groups or armed actors.

Their main issues are housing and infrastructure, because armed actors do not let them rebuild their houses due to political or security issues in some locations. There must be an appropriate Iraqi law related to the compensation of the HHs whose properties were destroyed or stolen due to conflicts and violations. The law 20 in 2009 needs to be revised to include many situations that were not available at that time.

Al-Hol Camp in Syria: The refugees of Iraqi families that are located in Al-Hol camp are mostly women and children under 12 years old, whose family members engaged with ISg. More than 30,000 Iraqi refugees are living in this camp under difficult situations and widespread violence. Some from Al-Hol camp returned to Iraq and settled in the Jad'ah 1 camp under strict Gol security restrictions. Jad'ah 1 camp security forces do not allow anyone to enter, even if they have permission. National and international NGOs must do their efforts to support these people in the Al-Hol camp (which some perceive to be 'prisoners') to reintegrate them within the community again.

Livelihood and Community Resilience: Financial support is needed until IDPs gain employment or livelihoods in their AoO. This includes on-the-job training, vocational training, and in-kind grants. Cash for work can be useful to support IDPs to work in the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic services. Agriculture, animal husbandry, and livestock support are also needed, such as access to high-yield seed varieties, fertilizers, training courses, and investment projects to boosting productivity (e.g. irrigation systems, greenhouses, and clean water channels). Vulnerable IDP groups (widows, divorced women, minors, and people with special needs) should receive consideration for support. People in Balad and Jazira Al-Khalidiya are particularly in need of support in this sector, because they have many constraints concerning the rehabilitation of their farms.

Social Interaction and Reintegration: There should be a reintegration program to ensure that IDPs have no fear of discrimination and social isolation. Tribal leaders can provide support to reintegrate IDPs and ensure that community members treat returnees in a normal manner with mutual respect.

Education and its Instruments: Education services should be provided to all returnees equally, regardless of ethnicity and marginalization. Support education services in Khana Sor and Balad specifically to improve deficiencies, such as the shortage of schools and teaching staff, which deters IDPs from returning.

Health Support: Expand the offer of critical public health services in the AoO, with a focus on health centers through the provision of medical supplies and health facilities. Also, consider providing an easily accessible mobile medical health service team in these areas (if applicable).

ANNEX 1. ITINERARY AND TIMELINE

DATE	ACTIVITIES / SITE VISITS DURING FIELD PHASE
Oct 14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contract signed between GC and SOSS.
Oct 15 – 19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team leader meeting with SOSS staff in Erbil Desk Review (DR)/Work Plan & Methodology.
Oct 20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SOSS and GC meeting in Sipan hotel – Erbil city to review and develop the research methodology and materials (IDI and FGD guides, survey questionnaire).
Oct 21 – 31	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preparation of SOSS staff's location, documents, and responsibilities according to each of the 3 governorates. Translation of materials into Arabic (IDI, FGD, consent form, & FGD attendance lists). Meeting with Anbar, Ninewa, and Salahaddin's staff. Recruiting for, and conducting, field IDIs & FGDs in Jazira Al-Khalidiya, Anbar governorate.
Nov 01 – 08	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local authority approval for survey data collection in Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin. Continue conducting field IDIs & FGDs in Jazira Al-Khalidiya, Anbar governorate. Continue conducting field IDIs & FGDs in Khana Sor/Sinjar, Nineveh governorate. Commence conducting field IDIs & FGDs in Balad of Salahaddin governorate. Preparing database for Mobile Data Collection (MDC) of the survey questionnaire.
Nov 09 – 28	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training of surveyors on the Mobile Data Collection (MDC) survey. Finishing field IDIs & FGDs in Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahaddin governorates. Implementation of survey f2f interviews in Khana Sor/Sinja. Development of SPSS database for data analyses.
Nov 28 – Dec 05	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of survey F2F interviews in Anbar, Erbil, Nineveh, and Salahaddin. Translations of IDIs and FGD reports.
Dec 06 – 15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commence data cleaning. Open-ended survey data coding. Commence data analysis & synthesis.
Dec 16 – 20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue data analysis & synthesis. Commence writing draft report by SOSS.
Dec 21 – 25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finishing of Writing draft report by SOSS.
Dec 26 – Jan 03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GC comments on draft report
Jan 04 – 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalizing report by SOSS
Jan 07	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PowerPoint Presentation in GC – Erbil Office



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May 2022



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